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Abstract—Instead of against eavesdropping, this letter pro-
poses a new paradigm in wireless security by studying how a
legitimate monitor (e.g., a government agency) efficiently eaves-
drops a suspicious wireless communication link. The suspicious
transmitter controls its communication rate over Rayleigh fading
channels to maintain a target outage probability at the receiver,
and the legitimate monitor can successfully eavesdrop only when
its achievable rate is no smaller than the suspicious communi-
cation rate. We propose a proactive eavesdropping via jamming
approach to maximize the average eavesdropping rate, where the
legitimate monitor sends jamming signals with optimized power
control to moderate the suspicious communication rate.
Index Terms—Legitimate surveillance, proactive eavesdrop-
ping, jamming power control, full-duplex.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS security has attracted a lot of research at-tentions recently, and there are extensive works inves-
tigating defense mechanisms, such as physical-layer security
techniques, to secure wireless communications against eaves-
dropping (see e.g. [1] and the references therein). However,
these existing works usually view eavesdropping as illegit-
imate attacks, and have limitations from a broader national
security perspective. Recently, with technical advancements
in e.g. smartphones and drones, criminals or terrorists can
potentially use them to establish wireless communication links
for committing crimes and terrorism. Therefore, there is a
growing need for government agencies (e.g., National Security
Agency in the US) to monitor and legitimately eavesdrop these
suspicious wireless communications (see, e.g., the Terrorist
Surveillance Program [2]).
In this letter, we propose a paradigm shift in wireless
security from preventing conventional eavesdropping attacks
to a new legitimate surveillance objective. In particular, we
consider a simple setup as shown in Fig. 1, where a legit-
imate monitor aims to eavesdrop a point-to-point suspicious
wireless communication link over Rayleigh fading channels.
We consider that the suspicious transmission is a conventional
communication link without using advanced physical-layer
security techniques,1 and the suspicious transmitter controls
its communication rate to maintain a target outage probability
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1This consideration is practical since it is difficult for the suspicious
transmitter to know the existence of the eavesdropper and obtain the channel
state information (CSI) of the eavesdropping channel.
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Fig. 1. A wireless legitimate surveillance scenario, where a full-duplex legit-
imate monitor aims to eavesdrop a point-to-point suspicious communication
link via jamming.
at the receiver. In this case, the legitimate monitor can suc-
cessfully decode and eavesdrop the suspicious communication
link (in eavesdropping non-outage) only when its achievable
data rate is no smaller than the suspicious communication
rate. In practice, the legitimate eavesdropping is very chal-
lenging, since the legitimate monitor may be far away from
the suspicious transmitter and wireless channels may fluctuate
significantly over time.
To overcome this issue, we propose an approach named
proactive eavesdropping via jamming, where the legitimate
monitor, operating in a full-duplex mode, sends jamming
signals to moderate the suspicious communication rate for
facilitating the simultaneous eavesdropping. In particular, we
optimize the jamming power at the legitimate monitor to max-
imize its average eavesdropping rate, which is defined as the
suspicious communication rate multiplied by the eavesdrop-
ping non-outage probability. We obtain the optimal jamming
power solution in closed-form. Numerical results show that
thanks to the optimized power control, the proposed proac-
tive eavesdropping via jamming outperforms the conventional
passive eavesdropping without jamming and the proactive
eavesdropping with constant-power jamming.
Note that there have been a handful of existing works
investigating malicious active eavesdropping attacks in the
wireless physical layer security literature, where the attacker
can jam and eavesdrop in a half-duplex [3]–[5] or full-duplex
mode [6]–[9]. However, this line of research aimed to design
defense methods against illegitimate active eavesdropping at-
tacks, while in this letter we utilize the legitimate proactive
eavesdropping for the purpose of surveillance, by leveraging
jamming in a full-duplex mode.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a legitimate surveillance
scenario, where a full-duplex legitimate monitor aims to
eavesdrop a point-to-point suspicious communication link via
jamming. The suspicious transmitter and receiver are each
2equipped with a single antenna, and the legitimate monitor is
equipped with two antennas, one for eavesdropping (receiving)
and the other for jamming (transmitting). We consider a block-
fading frequency-nonselective channel, where the wireless
channels remain constant over each transmission block. Over
any time block, let g0, g1, and g2 denote the channel power
gains from the suspicious transmitter to the suspicious receiver,
from the suspicious transmitter to the eavesdropping antenna
of the legitimate monitor, and from the jamming antenna of
the legitimate monitor to the suspicious receiver, respectively.
We consider Rayleigh fading for wireless channels, and thus
g0, g1, and g2 are modeled as independent exponentially
distributed random variables with parameters λ0, λ1, and
λ2, respectively, i.e., gi ∼ Exp(λi) with the mean being
1/λi, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. It is assumed that the legitimate monitor
does not know the CSI of g0 or g2 at each time block,
while it knows their channel distribution information (CDI).
Furthermore, we assume that the channel g1 is perfectly known
at the legitimate monitor in each time block.
We consider that the suspicious transmitter transmits with
a constant power P , while the legitimate monitor employs a
jamming power Q to interfere with the suspicious receiver
to facilitate the simultaneous eavesdropping. Accordingly,
the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at
the suspicious receiver and the received signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) at the legitimate monitor are denoted as γ0 = g0Pg2Q+σ20
and γ1 = g1Pσ2
1
, where σ20 and σ21 denote the noise powers at
the suspicious receiver and the legitimate monitor, respectively.
Here, the self-interference from the jamming antenna to the
eavesdropping antenna at the legitimate monitor is assumed
to be perfectly cancelled by using advanced analog and
digital self-interference cancellation methods. Assuming that
the information signal transmitted by the suspicious transmitter
and the jamming signal sent by the legitimate monitor are
both Gaussian distributed [10], the achievable data rates of
the suspicious link and the eavesdropping link (in bps/Hz) are
respectively expressed as
r0 = log2
(
1 +
g0P
g2Q+ σ20
)
, (1)
r1 = log2
(
1 +
g1P
σ21
)
. (2)
Since the suspicious transmitter is not aware of the in-
stantaneous CSI of the suspicious link, it employs a fixed
transmission rate, denoted by R, over all transmission blocks.
In each time block, if the achievable data rate r0 (or r1) is
greater than or equal to R, then the suspicious receiver (or the
legitimate monitor) can correctly decode the data sent by the
suspicious transmitter. Otherwise, it cannot decode correctly,
and declares an outage. Accordingly, the decoding and eaves-
dropping outage probabilities at the suspicious receiver and
the legitimate monitor are respectively denoted as
pout0 = P (r0 < R) , (3)
pout1 = P (r1 < R) . (4)
As a result, we define the average eavesdropping rate at the
legitimate monitor as the suspicious communication rate R
multiplied by the non-outage probability 1−pout1 , i.e., Ravg ,
R(1−pout1 ), which denotes the average rate correctly decoded
(eavesdropped) over a long time.
In practice, the suspicious transmitter adjusts its commu-
nication rate R to maintain the decoding outage probability
pout0 at the suspicious receiver to be fixed at a certain level, i.e.,
pout0 = δ, with δ > 0 denoting the target outage probability. By
exploiting such a property, the legitimate monitor can adjust its
jamming power Q to lessen the achievable data rate r0 of the
suspicious link, thus reducing the suspicious communication
rate R to keep pout0 = δ. In particular, we aim to optimize the
jamming power Q at the legitimate monitor to maximize its
average eavesdropping rate Ravg, for which the optimization
problem is formulated as
(P1) : max
Q,R
R(1− pout1 )
s.t. pout0 = δ, (5)
0 ≤ Q ≤ Qmax, (6)
where Qmax > 0 denotes the maximally allowable jamming
power of the legitimate monitor. Note that in problem (P1) the
suspicious communication rate R is an auxiliary optimization
variable, which changes as a function of Q according to (5)
(as will be shown later). In general, there is a trade-off in
determining the optimal jamming power Q to maximize Ravg
in (P1): a larger Q can reduce R more significantly, which
in turn helps improve the non-outage probability 1 − pout1 at
the legitimate monitor. This motivates us to optimize Q to
maximize Ravg.
III. OPTIMAL JAMMING FOR PROACTIVE EAVESDROPPING
In this section, we provide the optimal jamming power
solution for the legitimate monitor by solving problem (P1).
First, we derive the one-to-one relationship between R
and Q and transform problem (P1) into a single-variable
optimization problem over R. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1: It follows from (4) that
pout0 =1−
λ2/((2
R − 1)Q)
λ0/P + λ2/((2R − 1)Q)
e−λ0σ
2
0
(2R−1)/P . (7)
By combing this with (5), we have
Q = ψ(R) ,
Pλ2e
−λ0σ
2
0
(2R−1)/P
λ0(2R − 1)(1− δ)
−
λ2P
λ0(2R − 1)
. (8)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Here, the jamming power function ψ(R) in (8) is monoton-
ically decreasing in R. This intuitively means that to reduce
the suspicious communication rate R, higher jamming power
Q is required for the legitimate monitor. By using (8) together
with the constraint in (6), we have 0 ≤ ψ(R) ≤ Qmax, and
accordingly
ψ−1(Qmax) ≤ R ≤ ψ
−1(0), (9)
where ψ−1(·) is the inverse function of ψ(·). Specifically, we
have ψ−1(0) = log2
(
1 + −P ln(1−δ)
λ0σ20
)
and
ψ−1(Q) = log2
(
1 +
P
σ20λ0
W
(
σ20λ2
Q(1− δ)
e
σ2
0
λ2
Q
)
−
λ2P
Qλ0
)
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Fig. 2. The eavesdropping non-outage probability
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versus the jamming power at the legitimate monitor
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for any Q > 0, where W (x) denotes the Lambert W function
of x with W(x)eW(x) = x [11]. Furthermore, note that
pout1 = P
(
g1 < (2
R − 1)
σ20
P
)
= 1− e−λ1(2
R
−1)
σ2
0
P (10)
due to the fact that g1 ∼ Exp(λ1). As a result, problem (P1)
is equivalently reformulated as the following single-variable
optimization problem over R:
(P2) : max
R
R(1− pout1 ) = Re
−λ1(2
R
−1)
σ2
0
P
s.t. (9).
Next, we study problem (P2), for which we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.2: The objective function of (P2) is monotoni-
cally increasing over [0, R∗], and monotonically decreasing
over (R∗,+∞), where R∗ is the suspicious communication
rate achieving the maximum average eavesdropping rate, given
by
R∗ =
1
ln 2
W
(
P
λ1σ20
)
. (11)
Proof: See Appendix B.
From Lemma 3.2, we can easily obtain the optimal solutions
to (P2) and (P1) in the following theorem, for which the proof
is omitted for brevity.
Theorem 3.1: The optimal suspicious communication rate
R to (P2) and (P1) and the optimal jamming power Q to (P1)
are respectively given as
Ropt = max
(
min
(
ψ−1(0), R∗
)
, ψ−1(Qmax)
)
, (12)
Qopt = ψ(Ropt) = min (max (0, ψ(R
∗)) , Qmax) . (13)
Remark 3.1: The above optimal solution to (P1) is intu-
itively explained as follows. First, consider the case when R∗
is no smaller than the suspicious communication rate ψ−1(0)
with zero jamming power, which may happen when the eaves-
dropping channel is similar to or stronger than the suspicious
channel. In this case, we have Ropt = ψ−1(0) and thus
Qopt = 0, which means that the no jamming is required for
the legitimate monitor to maximize its average eavesdropping
rate. Next, consider R∗ < ψ−1(0) when the eavesdropping
channel is weaker than the suspicious channel. In this case,
the legitimate monitor should use a positive jamming power
Qopt = ψ(R
∗) to interfere with the suspicious receiver (as
long as the jamming power does not exceed the maximum
value Qmax), such that the suspicious transmitter reduces its
communication rate from ψ−1(0) to R∗ for maintaining the
outage probability at the suspicious receiver to be pout0 = δ,
thus maximizing the average eavesdropping rate Ravg.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to validate
our proposed proactive eavesdropping via jamming approach.
In the simulation, we set the average channel power gain of
the suspicious link as 1/λ0 = 1, with the parameter of the
exponentially distributed variable g0 being λ0 = 1. Here, the
channel power gains are normalized over the receiver noise
powers such that we can conveniently set the noise powers
to be σ20 = σ21 = 1. Furthermore, we set the target outage
probability at the suspicious link, the transmit power of the
suspicious transmitter, and the maximum jamming power at
the legitimate monitor to be δ = 0.05, P = 20 dB, and
Qmax = 30 dB, respectively.
Fig. 2 shows the eavesdropping non-outage probability
1− pout1 and the suspicious communication rate R versus the
jamming power at the legitimate monitor Q, where we set
the average channel power gains of the eavesdropping and
jamming links as 1/λ1 = 1/λ2 = 0.1, with the parameters
λ1 = λ2 = 10. This corresponds to the practical case
when the legitimate monitor is far away from the suspicious
transmitter and receiver. It is observed that as the jamming
power Q increases, the suspicious communication rate R
decreases, while the eavesdropping non-outage probability
1 − pout1 increases. Fig. 3 shows the average eavesdropping
rate Ravg = R(1 − pout1 ) versus the jamming power at the
legitimate monitor Q. It is observed that as Q increases,
Ravg first increases and then decreases. This is consistent
with Lemma 3.2. The maximum average eavesdropping rate is
observed to be achieved at the optimal jamming power Qopt
obtained in Theorem 3.1.
Fig. 4 shows the average eavesdropping rate Ravg versus
the average channel power gains of the eavesdropping and
jamming links, i.e., 1/λ1 = 1/λ2. We consider the following
two reference schemes for performance comparison.
4• Conventional passive eavesdropping without jamming: in
this scheme, the legitimate monitor does not send any
jamming signal, i.e., Q = 0.
• Proactive eavesdropping with constant-power jamming:
in this scheme, the legitimate monitor uses the maximum
jamming power, i.e., Q = Qmax.
It is observed that as the average channel gains of the
eavesdropping and jamming links increase, the average eaves-
dropping rates of the passive eavesdropping and the proactive
eavesdropping with optimal jamming increase, while that of
the proactive eavesdropping with constant-power jamming first
increases and then decreases. The proactive eavesdropping
with optimal jamming is observed to outperform the two
reference schemes. Specifically, when the channel gains are
small (e.g., smaller than −15 dB), the average eavesdropping
rate of passive eavesdropping is observed to be close to zero,
since the legitimate monitor is too far from the suspicious
transmitter and thus is difficult to eavesdrop successfully. In
contrast, the proactive eavesdropping (with both optimal and
constant-power jamming) is observed to achieve significant
average eavesdropping rate gain in this case. When the channel
gains become large (e.g., larger than −5 dB), the passive
eavesdropping and the proactive eavesdropping with optimal
jamming schemes are observed to achieve identical average
eavesdropping rates. This is consistent with our observations
in Remark 3.1.
V. CONCLUSION
This letter proposes a new legitimate eavesdropping
paradigm in wireless security, and presents a proactive eaves-
dropping via jamming approach, where the legitimate mon-
itor jams the suspicious wireless communication link for
improving the eavesdropping performance. By considering
Rayleigh fading channels, we obtain the optimal jamming
power in closed-form to maximize the average eavesdropping
rate. Thanks to the jamming with optimized power control,
our proposed proactive eavesdropping improves the average
eavesdropping rate significantly over the conventional passive
eavesdropping scheme without jamming, especially when the
legitimate monitor is far from the suspicious transmitter and
receiver. We believe that this work can provide new insights
on wireless legitimate surveillance for the national security.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3.1
From (4), it follows that pout0 can be re-expressed as
pout0 = P
(
g0P − g2(2
R − 1)Q < σ20(2
R − 1)
)
. (14)
First, we obtain the probability density function (PDF) of Z =
g0P − (2
R− 1)g2Q = X1−X2, where X1 , g0P and X2 ,
g2(2
R−1)Q. Note that gi ∼ Exp(λi), i ∈ {0, 2}. Accordingly,
denote λ˜1 = λ0/P and λ˜2 = λ2/((2R − 1)Q). Then we
have Xi ∼ Exp(λ˜i), i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, the PDF of Z =
X1 −X2 is expressed as
fZ(z) =
∫ +∞
0
fX2(z + x2)λ˜2e
−λ˜2x2dx2
=
{
λ˜1λ˜2
λ˜1+λ˜2
e−λ˜1z , if z > 0
λ˜1λ˜2
λ˜1+λ˜2
eλ˜2z , if z ≤ 0.
As a result, it follows that when z ≥ 0,
P(Z < z) =1−
λ˜2
λ˜1 + λ˜2
e−λ˜1z . (15)
By combining (14) and (15), we have pout0 = P(Z < σ20(2R−
1)) and thus (7) follows. Using (7) together with pout0 = δ in
(5), we have (8). Therefore, this lemma is proved.
B. Proof of Lemma 3.2
By letting x = 2R−1 ≥ 0 and accordinglyR = log2(1+x),
we can rewrite the objective function of (P2) as
φ(x) = log2(1 + x)e
−λ1x
σ2
0
P . (16)
As a result, proving this lemma is equivalent to showing that
φ(x) is monotonically increasing over [0, x∗], and monotoni-
cally decreasing over (x∗,+∞), where x∗ = 2R∗ − 1.
Taking the first-order derivative of φ(x), we have
φ′(x) =e−
λ1σ
2
0
x
P
(
1
ln 2 · (1 + x)
−
λ1σ
2
0
P
log2(1 + x)
)
.
By setting φ′(x) = 0, we have x∗ = 2R∗ − 1 with R∗ given
in (11). Furthermore, it is easy to show that φ′(x) > 0 when
x ∈ [0, x∗] and φ′(x) < 0 when x ∈ (x∗,∞). Therefore, this
lemma is proved.
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